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Abstract—In many systems privacy of users depends on the number of
participants applying collectively some method to protect their security.
Indeed, there are numerous already classic results about revealing
aggregated data from a set of users. The conclusion is usually as follows:
if you have enough friends to “aggregate” the private data, you can safely
reveal your private information.
Apart from data aggregation, it has been noticed that in a wider context
privacy can be often reduced to being hidden in a crowd. Generally, the
problems is how to create such crowd. This task may be not easy in some
distributed systems, wherein gathering enough “individuals” is hard for
practical reasons.
Such example are social networks (or similar systems), where users
have only a limited number of semi trusted contacts and their aim is to
reveal some aggregated data in a privacy preserving manner. This may
be particularly problematic in the presence of a strong adversary that
can additionally corrupt some users.
We show two methods that allow to significantly amplify privacy with
only limited number of local operations and very moderate communica-
tion overhead. Except theoretical analysis we show experimental results
on topologies of real-life social networks to demonstrate that our methods
can significantly amplify privacy of chosen aggregation protocols even
facing a massive attack of a powerful adversary.
We believe however that our results can have much wider applications
for improving security of systems based on locally trusted relations.
Index Terms—anonymity, random graph, big component, adversary
I. INTRODUCTION
Most algorithms providing anonymity or privacy in distributed
systems consist in hiding an element in a group of other elements.
Indeed, one of the very first definitions of anonymity from [1]
describes it as a state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects,
the “anonymity set”.
Similar approach to privacy in the context of data bases is caught
in k-anonymity metrics ( [2], [3], [4]). That is, the privacy is
preserved as long as each element is revealed in a group of at least k
other, identical elements. In this metric as well as some consecutive
concepts like ℓ-diversity [5] or m-invariance [6], the bigger the
“anonymity set” is, the stronger the privacy guarantees are. This idea
is also reflected in further definitions of anonymity/privacy [7], [8].
It turns out however that similar phenomenon can be also observed
in systems typically investigated from differential privacy perspective.
Let us remind that this privacy metric is in fact a standard one and
was introduced in the seminal paper [9]. In the context of distributed
system of somehow connected individuals we usually consider a
problem where some function of data has to be revealed preserving
privacy of individuals. Many real life cases fall into this scenario. The
most obvious example is privacy preserving data aggregation, wherein
we need to reveal e.g. a sum of values of users protecting their
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privacy at the same time. Such aim can be realized using combination
of cryptography and the common trick of adding random value, (a
noise), to the aggregated data (see for example [10] and [11]). It
turns however that the bigger the set of individual contributed to the
sum, the less noise has to be added to protect privacy of individuals.
Alternatively, having the same level of privacy one can reveal more
exact statistics if they refer to a bigger set of individuals.
In our paper we consider a distributed system that consists of
nodes (individuals having some local, possibly sensitive, data) with
connections constituting a graph modeled as a preferential attachment
process. This model is believed to be appropriate for a wide spectrum
of real systems including social networks. We may assume that
each individual has a very constrained knowledge about the network
limited to some (semi)trusted neighbors. We formally prove that
using a simple algorithm (adding some extra connections between
nodes) one may protect privacy of nodes even in the presence of an
adversary capable of corrupting significant number of nodes. What is
more important, our algorithm needs only some moderate number of
local operations. In particular, the exact topology or even its exact size
may remain unknown. Apart from rigid formal analysis we provide
experimental results performed on data from real networks.
In Section II we present a general model with adversary. In
Section III we present our distributed protocols which may be used
to enhance privacy (e.g. in social networks). In Sections IV and V
we provide analytic and experimental analysis of our protocols. In
Section VI we show two examples of privacy amplification using our
generic method. Then in Section VII we present some related papers
and finally in Section VIII we conclude and outline some interesting
problems for future work.
II. GENERAL ADVERSARIAL MODEL
We consider a social network represented as a graph G. The nodes
and edges of G represent users and friendship relation between pairs
of them, respectively.
Our model can be directly used for other distributed systems,
wherein a privacy preserving data computation problem is considered
(e.g., a sensor network or a systems of smart meters) as long as some
assumptions typical for social networks about the network topology
are fulfilled.
The intuition behind our adversarial model is as follows. We
assume that the Adversary can corrupt some of the users. Corruption
gives the Adversary control over the node, yet we assume that
he is an honest-but-curious type of Adversary. Namely, corrupted
nodes follow the protocol, but they are trying to learn information
about processed data and share all information they have with the
Adversary.
The corruption of nodes can either be done in a random way or
the Adversary can choose an arbitrary subset of nodes to corrupt,
knowing the exact structure of the graph (say, he may attack the
nodes with the highest degree). Note that random corruptions can
model scenario when some users install protecting software and
others remain attack-prone. This case also covers the situation with
unexpected failures, without an actual presence of Adversary.
Note that the Adversary has full access to all information processed
by corrupted nodes. As we show later, from the perspective of the
Adversary all connections incident to a corrupted node are removed
from the graph G.
Definition 1: We will say that a graph is ξ-strong if a subgraph
induced by its honest nodes has largest connected component of size
at least ξn, where n is the number of honest nodes.
Clearly, corruption of a significant number of nodes can dramat-
ically decrease the ξ-strength. For prevention, we can enrich the
graph by adding some edges between users, e.g., between some
arbitrary user and a friend of his friend. For practical reasons all
these operations need to be local (no global topology is known) and
simple.
We formally define Disconnection Game with Adversary A and a
distributed protocol P as follows. We have a network with underlying
undirected graph G = (V,E) This can either be a specific real net-
work graph or e.g., a randomly generated scale-free graph. We define
Disconnection Game, denoted by DG(G,A,P) in the following way:
1) P : the set of edges E is enriched by adding edges chosen
between pairs of unconnected nodes. Rules of adding edges
depend on specific game instantiation. This resulting graph is
denoted GP = (V,E ∪ EP ), where EP is the set of edges
added after P was applied.
2) The Adversary chooses, according to restrictions in this game
instantiation, a subset C of nodes. The nodes belonging to C
are corrupted and removed from the graph with their incident
edges denoted by EC . Note that the Adversary knows only the
initial graph G.
The resulting graph is denoted GA = (V \C, (E∪EP )\EC).
We assume that C does not depend on the set EP . This
assumption reflects the assumption that the adversary does not
know choices of uncorrupted nodes.
3) The outcome of the game is the fraction of nodes belonging to
the biggest connected component in graph GA.
The model presented in this section is a problem of robustness of
the network (see for example [12], [13], [14], [15]). It is, however,
worth mentioning that, unlike previous papers in that field, we require
that the enhancing protocol is done in a distributed way and without
much knowledge of global topology of the graph. Moreover, we pick
rather strong notion of robustness, namely the size of the largest
connected component.
If the resulting structure is ξ-strong, it means that there exists a
structure that is not controlled by the adversary that is connected
and contains at least ξ · n out of n nodes. Intuitively, this allows to
provide a common response secured in such way that the adversary
cannot observe separate inputs of nodes but the aggregated value of
a large set of nodes. In Section VI we present references to particular
protocols.
III. SECURITY-ENHANCING PROTOCOLS
We present two protocols aimed at improving ξ-strength of the
network and in consequence security of aggregation protocols. We
prove their properties both in analytic (Sec. IV) and experimental
(Sec. V) way for underlying graphs typical for social networks.
A. m-Two Steps Friend Finder
The person who wants to improve his chances of being in the
big component asks his friend (chosen uniformly at random) to
recommend him yet to another friend. Namely, our new friend is
a former "friend of a friend" that is added to the list of connections
(or just a separated contact used for privacy-preserving actions). This
procedure is iteratedm times, namely askm randomly chosen friends
for recommendations. That would result in obtaining (at most)m new
friends. Note that sometimes it might happen that a specific "friend
of a friend" will be recommended more than once.
Formally, every node that wants to actively participate in the
protocol performs a random walk of length 2 starting from himself.
Note that one could propose different length of the random walk,
our choice of length 2 is to minimize communication and keep the
protocol as local as possible.
Formally the m-Two Steps Friend Finder (m-2SFF, for shortness)
is presented as an Algorithm 1.
1 foreach node v do
2 for m times do
3 1. Choose node w uniformly at random from N(v).
4 2. Query w to get id of its neighbor.
5 3. Node w chooses u uniformly at random from N(w) and
sends its id to v.
6 4. Create edge (v, u).
Algorithm 1: m-2SFF
Note that m-2SFF can be performed by a node without any
knowledge of the underlying graph, except its neighbors. Moreover, it
can be done in a fully distributed manner, withO(mn′)messages sent
in the network, where n′ ≤ n is the number of nodes participating
in the protocol.
B. m-Ask Fat For a Friend
The approach in this protocol is substantially different. Here
we want to rely on the preferential attachment properties of real
networks. In particular, we assume that there is a commonly known
list of a few nodes with highest degrees. We will call them fat nodes.
In real life situation we might think that there are a few well-known
and somewhat trusted parties in the distributed system.
Existence of such fat nodes is typical for structures governed by
preferential attachment model (a.k.a. "rich get richer"). Note that there
is a vast research in this kind of models and it turns out that complex,
real life networks tend to exhibit such properties.
m-Ask Fat For a Friend (m -A3F) goes as follows. Every node
that wants to improve its chance to belong to the big component has
to choose uniformly at random one fat node from the common list
and ask for an address of one of its neighbors chosen at random.
Formally, m -A3F protocol is presented in Algorithm 2 and 3.
1 foreach node v do
2 for m times do
3 1. Choose node w at random from the common list of fat
nodes .
4 2. Query w to get id of its neighbor.
5 3. Node w chooses u uniformly at random from N(w) and
sends its id to v.
6 4. Create edge (v, u).
Algorithm 2: m -A3F (code for a regular node)
Using a list of ’fat’ nodes may be perceived as a bottleneck of the
protocol, yet one should easily realize that in many real life cases the
1 foreach fat node w do
2 if queried by node v then
3 Reply with u chosen at random from N(w).
Algorithm 3: m -A3F (code for a fat node)
fat node has significantly more resources. Think about the case where
the network is the WWW and ’fattest’ nodes are e.g., Google, Yahoo
or Facebook. Moreover a fat node does not participate in further
communication. It just contacts two nodes so that they can establish
an independent connection.
In the next Sections we show that using fat nodes for finding
friends substantially improves the immunity of the graph even facing
a massive attack of the adversary.
IV. ANALYTIC RESULTS
In this Section we analyse a specific, most interesting case of our
protocols in a general model. Other cases are also considered in the
next Section. Let us analyse the log n-A3F with Adversary knowing
the topology of graph G in advance thus attacking the nodes with the
highest degree. We consider G = (V,E) to be preferential attachment
graph having some properties that can be met in real-life networks.
One of such properties is existence (whp) of a group of vertices
having high (in some sense) degrees. Their neighborhood covers whp
the linear number of vertices from V .
Thus, let us assume throughout this Section the following. Let
W ⊂ V be the subset of vertices whose degrees vary from an/ log n
to bn/ log n for some constants a, b, |W | = C log n for some
constant C. W is the set of the fat nodes from our protocol and, at
the same time, the set of vertices that will be corrupted by Adversary.
By NW we denote the neighborhood of W without vertices from W ,
thus NW =
⋃|W |
i=1 N(wi) \W , where N(wi) is the neighborhood of
wi. We assume also that |V \ (W ∪NW )| = αn for some constant
0 < α < 1. Let Vα = V \ (W ∪NW ). We will use the well known
fact about the Erdös-Renyí G(n, p) model (see for example [16]),
namely that whenever p ≥ (1 + ε) log n/n for some ε > 0, then
whp G(n, p) is connected.
First, let us consider the case in which all vertices want to
participate in the log n-A3F Protocol.
Theorem 1: If Ca < 1− α then after executing log n-A3F for all
vertices in G = (V,E) we obtain GA = (V \W, (E ∪ EP ) \ EC)
which is whp 1-strong. (Recall that EP is the set of edges added
during the protocol execution and EC is the set of edges incident to
vertices from W .)
Proof. Note that the set of vertices of GA satisfies V \W = NW ∪Vα
and NW and Vα are disjoint. First, let us concentrate on the set NW .
Let u, v ∈ NW . Let i be such that {wi, v} ∈ E. Let us estimate
the probability that there exists an edge {u, v} (denote this event by
[u ↔ v]). Let [u → v] denote the event that u established an edge
{u, v} during the protocol. For some ε > 0 and sufficiently big n
we get
P[u→ v] ≥ 1−
(
1−
1
C log n
1
deg(wi)
)log n
≥
1−
(
1−
1
C log n
log n
an
)log n
≥
1− e−
log n
Can ≥
log n
Can+ log n
≥ (1 + ε) log (|NW |)/|NW |.
(1)
Note that 1/(C log n deg(wi)) is the lower bound for the probability
that v establishes an edge {v, u} in a single step of the protocol.
Indeed, wi does not need to be the only neighbor of u in W .
The second inequality follows from the bounds for deg(wi). The
third inequality follows from the fact that (1 − 1/x)x converges
to 1/e from below for x > 0, the fourth one from the fact that
ex ≥ 1 + x. The last inequality follows because Ca < 1 − α
and |NW | = (1 − α)n − C log n. Since each vertex creates new
edges during the protocol independently from other vertices, we have
P[u ↔ v] = P[u → v] + P[v → u] − P[u → v]P[v → u].
Of course, the lower bound (1) is true also for P[v ↔ u] for all
u, v ∈ NW . We can think that the subgraph of G induced on NW
(denote it by G(NW )) decomposes into Erdos-Renyi G(NW , p),
where p ≥ (1+ε) log (|NW |)/|NW |, and some other random graph.
Thus G(NW ) will inherit some monotone properties of G(NW , p),
among others, it will be connected whp. Since Adversary corrupts
the nodes with the highest degrees, namely the whole set W , all
the vertices from NW will stay in GA. Thus we have proved the
existance (whp) of a giant component (which contains G(NW )) of
size at least |NW | = (1− α)n− C log n in GA.
Now, let us concentrate on the set Vα. Let us estimate the
probability that a vertex v ∈ Vα is not connected with G(NW )
(denote this event by [v 6↔ G(NW )]). What needs to happen is
that whenever the fat node sends to v the id of u, u needs to be a
fat node as well. Since there are C log n fat nodes and their degrees
are at least an/ log n, we obtain
P[v 6↔ G(NW )] ≤
(
1
C log n
C log n
an/ log n
)log n
=
(
log n
an
)log n
.
Vertices from Vα act during the protocol independently and the above
probability is so small that we can simply estimate the probability
that all vertices from Vα are connected with G(NW ) (denote this
event by [Vα ↔ G(NW )]) and show that it happens whp:
P[Vα ↔ G(NW )] ≥
(
1−
(
log n
an
)log n)αn
n→∞
−−−−→ 1.
Thus whp GA is connected.

The above theorem gave us a very strong result however its
assumption about the number of vertices taking part in the protocol
was also very strong. Now, let us discuss the following case: β
fraction of vertices from Vα and γ fraction of vertices from NW
take part in the protocol. (We don’t care about vertices from W
because they are going to be corrupted and their incident edges will
not appear in GA eventually).
Theorem 2: If Ca < 1−α and Cb > γ(1−α) then after executing
log n-A3F for vertices as described above on G = (V,E) we obtain
GA = (V \W, (E∪EP )\EC) which is whp (1− (1−β)α)-strong.
Proof. Let N˜W denote the set of vertices from NW which take part
in the protocol (|N˜W | = γ|NW |). Even though the vertices from
NW \ N˜W do not take part in the protocol, they can be chosen
as those to whom vertices from N˜W establish new edges. Let us
estimate the probability that v ∈ NW \N˜W will not get connected to
any vertex from N˜W during the execution of the protocol (denote this
event by [v 6↔ G(N˜W )]). Let i be such that wi and v are neighbors
in G. We have
P[v 6↔G(N˜W )] ≤
(
1−
1
C log n
1
deg(wi)
)γ|NW | log n
≤
(
1−
1
Cbn
)γ|NW | log n
≤ e−(γ logn|NW |)/(Cbn) =
n−γ(1−α)/(Cb)nlog n/(bn)
(compare 1).
Now, let us estimate the probability that all vertices from (NW \
N˜W ) are going to be connected with G(N˜W ) (denote this event by
[(NW \ N˜W )↔ G(N˜W )]). We get
P[(NW \ N˜W )↔ G(N˜W )]] ≥(
1− n−γ(1−α)/(Cb)nlog n/(bn)
)(1−γ)|NW |
=(
1− n−γ(1−α)/(Cb)nlog n/(bn)
)(1−γ)((1−α)n−C log n)
n→∞
−−−−→ 1
since Cb > γ(1− α). Thus again whp G(NW ) is connected.
By calculations analogous to those from Theorem 1 we also get
that all vertices from Vα which participate in the protocol (denote
this set by V˜α) are connected with G(NW ) whp. We proved that
whp GA has a giant component containing NW ∪ V˜α, |NW ∪ V˜α| =
(1− α)n−C log n+ βαn. This completes the proof.

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We present experimental results conducted on real data of Epinions
social network collected in SNAP dataset by Stanford University (see
[17] and [18]).
This is a who-trust-whom online social network of a a general
consumer review site Epinions.com. Members of the site can decide
whether to ”trust” each other. All the trust relationships interact and
form the Web of Trust which is then combined with review ratings
to determine which reviews are shown to the user. Our network
has 75879 nodes and 508837 edges where nodes denote users of
Epinions.com site and edges denote trust relation.
A. Random Failures
Random failures is a widely used model in network robustness but
also fault tolerance (see [19]) literature. We assume that corrupted
nodes (or in other words, nodes which are prone to failure) are
distributed in a uniform way across the whole network.
1) m-2SFF Protocol: First let us concentrate on the m-2SFF
Protocol in the case of Random Failures. Initially we assume that
all nodes launch the m-2SFF Protocol, namely each node does m
random walks of length 2 to establish extra connections. Obviously,
the larger m, the better safety of the nodes.
In Figure 1 we show how the m-2SFF Protocol performs on
Epinions social network graph under Random Failures model. We
can see how the network behaves without any enrichment, and with
m = 1, 5, 10, 15. Note that on the x-axis we have the percentage
of corrupted nodes. With m = 15 walks, around 70% of remaining
nodes are in the single giant connected component. Note that the
edges are added before the corruption phase. Therefore, for each
remaining node, a lot of added neighbors are corrupted and therefore
useless. On the positive side, one can easily see that for up to around
20% failures, even 5 walks are sufficient to have almost every node
belonging to the giant component.
Despite these somewhat optimistic results, it is quite unrealistic
to assume that all users want to participate. We want to weaken
this assumption. We still demand high level of security, at least for
the participating users. In the Figure 2 we show some experimental
results when a part of nodes participates, only. Here we assume m =
15 and q = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 fraction of participating nodes. That is,
q · n nodes participate in 15-2SFF protocol. Then we are interested
what is the fraction of participating users that belong to the biggest
Fig. 1: m-2SFF under Random Failures model.
component and how it compares to the situation when all users do
participate.
Fig. 2: 15-2SFF under Partial Participation and Random Failures
model. The top figure shows 10% participation, middle shows 25%
participation and bottom 50% participation.
Note that in the case where q = 0.1 there is a significant
decrease of security. Namely, with massive number of failures, we
have around 30% nodes in biggest component in comparison to
70% in the full participation case. Note that even if we consider
only the subset of participating nodes, then the fraction of nodes
belonging to biggest component amongst them is below 40%. The
security indeed improves with greater q, yet still even if we consider
only the participating nodes, the results are significantly worse than
when all users participate. Thus this protocol turned to be useful in
communities if we know that strong majority of nodes is willing to
use it.
2) m- A3F Protocol: Now we focus on them-A3F protocol under
Random Failures model. Again, we initially assume that all nodes
participate in the protocol, namely each node does m queries which
consist of randomly choosing one of the fat nodes and asking for
randomly chosen neighbor of that node. Here we fixed the number
of the nodes considered fat for ⌊log(n)⌋ = 16. It means that 16
nodes which have the highest degree in the initial graph are on the
common list of ’fat nodes‘.
In Figure 3 one can see the performance of A3F on Epinions social
network graph under Random Failures model. Similarly as before, we
show the behavior of the network without any enrichment, and with
m = 1, 5, 10, 15. This time, with m = 15 queries, almost 90%
of remaining nodes are in the giant component despite of a large
number of failures. Another interesting thing to observe is that the
cutoff (moment when the fraction of nodes in the giant component
begins to decrease significantly) appears much farther. For example,
in case of 15-2SFF we see that the size of the giant component starts
to deteriorate since approximately 30% failures, before this threshold
it remains very close to 100%. In the case of 2SFF, on the other hand,
for m = 15 the cutoff appears as far as 70% failures and before such
a massive corruption of nodes, it remains negligibly close to 100%.
Fig. 3: m-A3F under Random Failures model.
Again we are interested in the performance of A3F in the case
where only a fraction of users wants to participate. We assumed m =
15 and q = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 participation. In Figure 4 we have shown
the results for 2SFF with partial participation.
The most interesting thing is the fact that the safety level amongst
the participating nodes in case of partial participation is virtually the
same as the safety level when all nodes participate. This fact is very
important from the practical point of view. It gives the users a choice
- whether they want to sacrifice their safety and not participate in the
protocol, or participate in the protocol and be safe no matter what
other users choose as long as at least some fraction (say 10%) decides
to participate in the protocol.
Fig. 4: 15-A3F under Partial Participation and Random Failures
model. The top figure shows 10% participation, middle shows 25%
participation and bottom 50% participation.
3) Comparison: A glance at the figures in this subsection is
enough to see thatm-A3F performs better thanm-2SF under Random
Failures regime. See for example that for m = 10 and for 90%
failures the A3F protocol gives approximately 80% nodes belonging
to the giant component, while 2SFF gives only 60%. Moreover, for
the cutoff and therefore non-negligible deterioration of the fraction
of nodes in the biggest component appears for greater fraction of
failures than in m-2SF protocol.
Intuitively, these differences in the results stem from the fact that in
A3F we leverage naturally emerging preferential attachment models
in real, complex networks, while 2SFF does not really utilize this fact.
Connecting to neighbors of fixed, high-degree set of nodes massively
improves robustness of real networks.
B. Targeted Adversary
In this subsection we present experiments conducted under far
stronger Adversarythat can corrupt nodes of the highest degree.
Namely, if the Adversary has to corrupt k nodes, she sorts the list of
nodes by degree and corrupts first k of them.
Note that the Adversary only has access to the initial graph, without
enrichment. Obviously, for a specific instance of the graph one could
possibly devise a more clever way of attack, however this strategy
seems to be optimal in general. Note that complex network which
resemble preferential attachment features are extremely prone to such
attacks.
1) m-2SFF protocol: In Figure 5 we show how m-2SFF performs
on Epinions social network graph under Targeted Adversary model.
We can see how the network behaves without any enrichment, and
withm = 1, 5, 10, 15. Note that on the x-axis we have the percentage
of corrupted nodes and this time it ranges from 0 to 30% instead of
0−90% due to the Adversary’s strength. Note that without enrichment
the fraction of nodes in the biggest2 component dramatically falls to
2Note that from graph-theory perspective we have in this case a giant
component - a single component that contains a fraction of all nodes
almost 0 for 20% failures. In other words, if the Adversary destroys
20% nodes of highest degree, the remaining graph consists only of
very small components. On the other hand, see that for up to 5%
corruptions the m = 15 walks version gives almost 100% nodes
belonging to the biggest component. Even for 30% corruption the
fraction of nodes in the biggest component is considerably large
(approximately 60%). Recall that without enrichment under such a
strong adversary there is virtually no giant component whatsoever.
Fig. 5: m-2SFF under Targeted Attack.
Let us investigate the protocol if we assume that only a fraction
of non-corrupted users participate actively. We assumed m = 15
and q = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 participation. In Figure 6 we have shown
the results for m-2SFF with partial participation under Targeted
Adversary regime.
An interesting difference between the results for this model and
Random Failures can be seen in this figure. Namely, the fraction
of nodes belonging to the giant component amongst those who
participate is only slightly greater than amongst those who do
not participate. This is highly undesired, as it gives no notion of
improvement and benefit of participating actively in the protocol. A
node could decide that it is pointless to waste precious resources and
rather hope that the others would participate actively. See that even if
half of the users actively participate, the fraction of nodes in the giant
component are significantly smaller than when all nodes participate.
2) m-A3F protocol: After somewhat unsatisfying results for m-
2SFF under Targeted Adversary, we will now present experiments
on the m-A3F protocol. As before, let us first assume that all nodes
participate in the protocol.
In Figure 7 one can see the performance of m-A3F on Epinions
social network graph under Targeted Adversary model. As previously,
we show the behavior of the network without any enrichment, and
for the cases where m = 1, 5, 10, 15. This time, with m = 15
queries, approximately 85% of remaining nodes are in the biggest
component for up to 30% corruptions and over 95% of nodes are in
the giant component for up to 15% corruptions. Another interesting
thing to observe is that the cutoff again appears for greater number
of corruptions. For example, in case of 15-2SFF we see that the size
Fig. 6: Partial 15-2SFF under Targeted Attack. The top figure shows
10% participation, middle shows 25% participation and bottom 50%
participation.
of the giant component starts to deteriorate since approximately 5%
failures, before this threshold it remains close to 100%. In the case
of 15-A3F, on the other hand, the cutoff appears as far as at 10%
failures.
Fig. 7: m-A3F under Targeted Attack.
Similarly as in the previous subsection, we want to see how the
protocol behaves if we assume that only a fraction of non-corrupted
users participate actively. We assumedm = 15 and q = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5
participation. In Figure 8 we show the results for A3F with partial
participation under Targeted Adversary regime.
Fig. 8: Partial 15-A3F under Targeted Attack. The top figure shows
10% participation, middle shows 25% participation and bottom 50%
participation.
Figure 8 is probably the most striking one due to the fact that
in all three cases, one can easily see that the fraction of nodes
belonging to the giant component amongst the actively participating
nodes is almost the same as when all nodes participate. This is a
very desirable feature of m-A3F because it gives the user a natural
choice - participate in the protocol, which costs come computational
resources, but be in the giant component independently of the choices
of other nodes or do not participate, but then you are facing serious
risk of ending up disconnected from the giant component.
3) Comparison: First of all, the results for both protocols are obvi-
ously worse than for Random Failure model, which is not surprising.
However, they still give a significant improvement of the size of the
giant component. Moreover, in the regime of Targeted Adversary, the
m-A3F has a very interesting property of assuring almost the same
fraction of nodes belonging to the giant component for participating
fraction of nodes (even if only 10% of users participate) as in the
case where all users participate.
This regime shows that m-A3F is indeed a very powerful en-
richment to the graph structure. Note that we went from no giant
component for 20% failures to almost 90% nodes belonging to the
giant component amongst the actively participating nodes even if
only 10% of users participate. This scenario shows a significant
improvement of security which is gained via m-A3F for those
who actively participate in it. Note that the difference between the
performance of m-2SFF and m-A3F is strongly connected with
utilizing preferential attachment in real networks.
VI. SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Let us assume that graph G is ξ-strong.
Corollary 1: Assume that we have a network with underlying
graph G which is ξ-strong. Then using cryptographic methods for
data aggregation (see for example [10]) one can aggregate data even
without adding noise. Such results are already presented in literature
and require appropriate amount of users participating (see [20], [21],
[22])
Corollary 2: Assume that we have a network with underlying graph
G which is ξ-strong. Then aggregation protocol PAALEC from [23]
with parameters α = exp( ǫ
∆
) and β = 2 log(1/δ)
s
applied to graph G
is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private for the nodes belonging to the largest
connected component. Moreover, PAALEC aggregation protocol is
(ǫ, δ + (1− ξ))-differentially private for any arbitrary node.
VII. PREVIOUS AND RELATED WORK
This paper spans several areas, thus many different papers should
be pointed as related work. Since the idea of scale free network mod-
eling appeared, there has been a vast amount of research concerning
these kind of networks, including classic papers like [24], [25], [26],
[27], [28]. Also worth mentioning are papers which provided rigorous
mathematical treatment for scale free networks [29], [30], [31]. More
recent papers on properties of scale free networks include [32], [33].
Also worth mentioning are papers [34], [35] where authors consider
various properties of a graph given its expected degree list.
We should also mention papers about community structure in large
networks [36], [37]. Some empirical result can also be found in [38].
The problem of robustness in complex networks has also been
widely analyzed. To mention a few papers concerning the robustness
and enhancing of robustness in scale free networks we cite [15], [39],
[13], [40]. One should also mention [41] wherein authors consider
adversarial deletion in scale free graphs and [12], where authors
improve graph robustness by edge modifications. Note that, in the
network robustness literature the notion of robustness is mostly the
fact that the largest connected component exists. Here, however, we
are interested in non-asymptotic results and more precise size (or
lower bound for the size) of the giant component. Moreover, our
protocols can be performed locally and without knowledge of the
graph topology.
Furthermore, papers concerning various anonymity and ’crowd-
blending’ concepts should be mentioned. See for example [1], [8],
[7], [3], [4] for k-anonymity. See also [5], [6] for extensions and
variations of anonymity.
We should also mention some privacy preserving papers with
emphasis on those which could benefit from having large connected
component of appropriate size, namely [20], [21], [22], [23]. Also
important are the papers [10], [19] where authors use cryptographic
methods to amplify privacy for large group of users in data aggre-
gation scenario. For survey about privacy see [42] and references
therein.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented how to improve the size of the largest connected
component under massive adversarial attack and demonstrated why
this observation is important for a wide range of applications (with
most emphasis put on privacy preserving protocols). Moreover, our
methods are conceptually simple and can be performed locally, i.e.
with minimal knowledge about the global network. We proved that
the presented methods are efficient in preferential-attachment graphs,
which are commonly believed to be an accurate model of various
real-life networks including social interaction networks, World Wide
Web, airline networks and many other. Finally, we confirmed our
observations using experiments on graphs of real networks.
We believe that many questions important both for theory as well as
design of practical privacy preserving solutions are left unanswered.
In particular, for future work we plan to investigate:
• even stronger Adversary, who can choose adaptively (namely
during the enhancement protocol) vertices to corrupt;
• longer random walks, where we establish an edge with every
node visited on the way;
• Our protocols improve security of participating individuals, but
the level of privacy is improved also for other users. The
questions is, how to design a mechanism (i.e., via constructing
extra incentives) to improve global privacy dependently on a
power of the adversary.
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